## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

## **Docket No. 36179**

STATE OF IDAHO,	) 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 683
Plaintiff-Respondent,	) Filed: November 19, 2009
v.	Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
MICHAEL J. WILSON,	) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
	) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
Defendant-Appellant.	) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
	)

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Nez Perce County. Hon. Jeff M. Brudie, District Judge.

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of concurrent unified five-year sentences, with two-year determinate terms, for receiving or transferring stolen vehicles and felony eluding, <u>affirmed</u>.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; GRATTON, Judge; and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Michael J. Wilson pled guilty to receiving or transferring stolen vehicles, I.C. § 49-228, and felony eluding, I.C. § 49-1404(1)(2)(a). The district court imposed concurrent unified five-year sentences, with two-year determinate terms, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentences and placed Wilson on probation. Three months later Wilson violated the terms of his probation. While he was awaiting disposition on the first violation, he violated probation again. He admitted violating probation, and the court delayed disposition so that Wilson could participate in treatment. After Wilson completed a treatment program and screening for additional treatment, his probation was reinstated. Within a few months Wilson

again violated his probation. The district court revoked probation and ordered execution of the original sentences. Wilson appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and that the sentences are excessive and should have been sua sponte reduced by the district court upon revocation of probation.

It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; *State v. Beckett*, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); *State v. Adams*, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); *State v. Hass*, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. *State v. Upton*, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; *Hass*, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328; *State v. Marks*, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. *Beckett*, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328.

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. *See State v. Hernandez*, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); *State v. Lopez*, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); *State v. Toohill*, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. *State v. Oliver*, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we do not base our review solely upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed. *State v. Whittle*, 145 Idaho 49, 52, 175 P.3d 211, 214 (Ct. App. 2007). Rather, we also examine all the circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the sentence, including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation of probation. *Id*.

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering execution of Wilson's original sentences without modification. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Wilson's previously suspended sentences is affirmed.